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ABSTRACT
The 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait threatened the vital national interests 
of nations around the world and prompted the international community to condemn 
Saddam Hussein's use of military force. Citing Iraqi violations of internationally-held 
norms, the international community called for an immediate multilateral response to Iraqi 
aggression through the United Nations.
In explaining this multilateral response, traditional rationalist approaches are 
unable to explore the full role that international norms played in the conflict. Instead, an 
alternative approach such as constructivism, which acknowledges the importance of ideas 
and intersubjective meanings in shaping interaction, can best explain the major powers' 
preference for responding multilaterally.
Analyzing pre-war discourse in the Persian Gulf from the 2 August 1990 Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait to the 16 January 1991 UN-sponsored collective intervention, this 
thesis explores the relationship between norms of military intervention and the social 
construction of interests and identities. Specifically, this thesis suggests that the 
constitutive rules underpinning international norms provided modes of intervention with 
three sets of normatively-charged meanings, thereby enabling social action to occur. And, 
at the same time, the constitutive rules shaped interventionary practices by providing the 
building blocks needed for states to construct socially-acceptable interests and identities.
NORMS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES
INTRODUCTION
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 outraged the international 
community and prompted nations worldwide to condemn Saddam Hussein's unilateral use 
of military force. Large and small powers alike immediately identified vital national 
interests to be at stake. In formulating their responses, though, no nations chose to take 
unilateral military action to protect those interests. Instead, they decided to respond 
multilaterally through the Security Council and pass a series of resolutions demanding 
Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.1
Explaining this multilateral response presents an interesting empirical puzzle. 
Considering the strategic importance of the Gulf region, why would nations such as the 
United States, which possessed ample military capabilities to single-handedly repel Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait, prefer to respond through the multilateral channels of the United 
Nations and gamble on securing the support of the international community?
In explaining this puzzle, this thesis examines the relationship between norms of 
military intervention and interest and identity formation in the Gulf. Specifically, this 
thesis explores how the intersubjective meanings that constitute norms both enabled and
^though the United States did unilaterally deploy some military forces to the 
Gulf region following the passage of resolution 661 (1990) to begin enforcement of the 
embargo, the U.S. did not use military force against recalcitrant vessels until it received 
authorization through Security Council resolution 665 (1990).
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3shaped action in the Gulf, thereby leading to the construction of collective interests and 
identities. In conducting this investigation, traditional rationalist approaches would be 
unable to explore the full role that norms of military intervention played in the conflict. 
Neorealism, for example, argues that structure provides all states with roughly uniform 
interests and therefore focuses solely on the distribution of military capabilities. Neo­
liberalism, meanwhile, looks only at the material causes of behavior, thereby preventing 
such approaches from acknowledging the importance of the ideas and meanings that 
underlie norms of military intervention.
To best capture the intersubjective quality of norms, this thesis takes a 
constructivist approach that emphasizes the importance of social relationships and shared 
knowledge in constituting meaningful practices. In explaining collective action in the 
Gulf, it is necessary to answer several questions. Did a norm pertaining to the mode of 
military intervention exist? Where did it come from? How did intersubjective 
understandings of norms enable and constitute behavior? How did the constitutive rules 
of military intervention affect intersubjective understandings of legitimate forms of action 
in the Gulf? And, how did intersubjective understandings of the norms of military 
intervention shape the construction of interests and identities in the Gulf War?
In answering these questions, this thesis looks specifically at the period between 
the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 16 January 1991 UN-sanctioned 
collective intervention. After reviewing constructivism and two alternative theoretical 
approaches, this thesis considers the origins of the norm of collective intervention by 
briefly exploring the persistence of multilateral arrangements in shaping and defining past
4security structures.2 Specifically, this section argues that the generalized principles of 
conduct that underpin multilateral relations have historically embodied the norm of 
collective intervention, and that, by the late 1980's, this norm was strong enough to 
influence states' perceptions of their interests.3 The next section shows that the 
international community perceived the most appropriate framework for resolving the 
conflict in the Gulf to reside in the multilateral channels of the United Nations.
Additionally, states viewed the most appropriate mode of response to be some form of 
collective intervention.
The following section problematizes norms of military intervention by exploring 
their underlying constitutive rules to understand how norms constituted behavior and 
enabled meaningful action to occur. Specifically, this section argues that the constitutive 
rules of military intervention provided the mode of collective intervention with three 
interrelated meanings: serving the collective interests of the international community; 
stabilizing a presumably volatile situation; and, acting under the authority of the 
international community. Conversely/the constitutive rules provide unilateral intervention 
with three very different meanings: using force to pursue selfish, material interests;
2It will not be the purpose of this section to argue that every past security structure 
contained elements of multilateralism, but rather, that multilateral structures have, at 
various times in the past, played large roles in maintaining international security.
3As will be explained later in greater detail, the term ''collective intervention" does 
not necessarily refer to the multinational composition of military forces, but on a more 
fundamental level, to the collective nature of the decision-making process that authorizes 
the intervention. In this sense, a collective intervention could theoretically be carried out 
by a single nation if the decision to intervene was made and sanctioned by a collective 
body.
recklessly risking an escalation of violence; and, taking unauthorized action solely at the 
discretion of the individual state. Consequently, the, constitutive rules of military 
intervention brand unilateralism as "illegitimate" and multilateralism as "legitimate" at the 
normative level.
In the final section, this thesis explores how intersubjective understandings of 
norms shaped the construction of interests and identities in the Gulf War. Specifically, it 
argues that states continually attempted to empower themselves with legitimacy by 
constructing interests and identities that appealed to the meanings constitutively attached 
to the mode of collective intervention. And, conversely, states attempted to brand the 
actions of opposing forces as illegitimate by constructing the identity and interests of those 
forces around the negative meanings constitutively attached to the mode of unilateral 
intervention. This is why major powers such as the United States formulated its response 
to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf through the multilateral channels of the United Nations. By 
linking action with normatively-charged meaning, the constitutive rules of military 
intervention provided states with the building blocks needed to construct socially- 
acceptable collective interests and identities.
CHAPTER I
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND EXPLANATIONS
In exploring the empirical puzzle presented in the introduction, traditional 
neorealist approaches would have difficulty explaining why the United States preferred to 
respond to Iraqi aggression multilaterally. To reveal why, it is first necessary to consider 
neorealism's rationalist foundations. As Wendt points out, any given theory leads the 
political scientist to ask only certain questions while excluding others from consideration.4 
Neorealism, then, as with other "rationalist"5 approaches, leads the theorist to ask 
behavior-oriented questions, such as, "What cpurse of action, given a set of externally 
fixed assumptions, would be 'adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the 
situation.'"6
Specifically, neorealism assumes that the international system is comprised of 
rational, self-interested states competing for power in an anarchic environment. 
Neorealists therefore posit that structure creates a system of self-help that thrusts states
4Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics," International Organization (Spring 1992), 391-392.
5Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International 
Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 379-396.
6H.A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics : The dialogue of Psychology with 
Political Science, " American Political Science Review 79 (1985): 294.
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7into the position of continually struggling for power and relative gains to ensure their own 
survival. These structural constraints provide all states with roughly uniform interests. If 
states fail to heed the imperatives of power politics and pursue different interests, they will 
be driven from the system or destroyed.7 Accordingly, neorealists do not problematize 
interests and identities and instead treat them as exogenously given. Only material 
distributions of power change.
To explain the decision to intervene collectively in the Gulf conflict, neorealism 
would therefore explore the relationship between the distribution of military capabilities 
and the observed outcome so as to reveal the material causes of the behavior.
Accordingly, neorealism only predicts that the United States and its allies would respond 
to the invasion of Kuwait by attempting to balance Iraqi power in the Gulf. Neorealism 
cannot explain the form that the balancing behavior was to take. Explaining the 
preference for multilateralism therefore requires this thesis to take an alternative approach.
Neo-liberalism, meanwhile, would argue that internationally-held norms acted as 
intervening variables in the Gulf War to "constrain" state actions. Norms can be defined 
as "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations."8 Neo-liberals would 
then argue that, by shaping expectations, reducing transaction costs, and increasing 
communication and transparency, norms of military intervention created powerful
7For the classic example of neo-realism, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f 
International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
8Stephen Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as 
intervening variables," in International Regimes, Stephen Krasner, ed. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.
8incentives for the United States to formulate its response to Iraqi aggression through 
multilateral channels. However, several major problems hamper neo-liberal approaches to 
the study of norms.
Following Wendt, I will differentiate between "weak" and "strong" neo-liberals.9 
While both express strong interests in how different international institutional 
arrangements can decrease the costs associated with cooperation under an anarchic 
environment, weak neo-liberals accept neorealism's core assumptions, thereby forcing 
them to subordinate process-oriented questions -- such as how interaction might generate 
interests and identities -- to structure.
As a result, weak neo-liberals also fail to problematize interests, thereby rendering 
their approach unable to explore the preference for collective action outside of the 
constraints imposed by neorealism's limited, material conception of structure. Weak neo­
liberals therefore can only study the norm’s impact on behavior. Of course, weak neo- 
liberals could attempt to compensate for their lack of attention to the dynamics of interest 
formation by working backwards and plugging in new assumptions to account for 
changing contexts. However, at some point, they must ask where those interests and 
preferences are coming from, and apart from plugging in new fixed assumptions, this they 
cannot do.10
The strong neo-liberals, meanwhile, are interested in studying how process and 
interaction can bring about transformations of states' interests and identities.11
^ en d t, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," 392-393.
10Keohane, "International Institutions," 390.
Accordingly, by refusing to accept all of neorealism's core assumptions, this approach can 
shift behavior from the dependent to the independent variable and free interests from their 
externally fixed parameters. Such an approach, which problematizes interests and 
identities, therefore offers promise in explaining why the intervening forces preferred to 
act collectively in the Gulf War. However, strong neo-liberal approaches are still limited 
by their rationalist foundations.
As explained above, the emphasis that rationalism places on maximizing outcomes 
leads neo-liberalism to focus on the material causes of behavior that can easily be 
incorporated into some form of cost-benefit analysis. As a result, this commitment to 
rationalism prevents strong neo-liberals from studying how ideas and intersubjective 
understandings of norms can affect the construction of interests and identities.12 Instead, 
even strong neo-liberals must maintain a fundamentally material-driven, behavioral- 
conception of process, thereby leading neo-liberal approaches to regime and norm analysis 
to focus solely on the "regulative” aspect of rules. While restricting analysis of norms to 
this particular function can still generate insights into the conditions under which norms 
can constrain state behavior, it leads neo-liberals to ignore how rules, on a more
nWendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," 393. For such examples, see 
Joseph Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International 
Organization (Summer, 1987); Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," 
World Politics (April, 1988); and Robert Keohane, "International Liberalism 
Reconsidered," in The Economic Limits to Modem Politics, John Dunn, ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
l2I do not mean to suggest that rationalist epistemologies necessarily preclude neo­
liberals from exploring the importance of ideas in shaping interests and identities. Rather, 
in a “paradigmatic” sense, rationalism simply leads neo-liberal approaches to focus on the 
material causes of behavior.
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fundamental level, can also function "constitutively."13
Defined by Giddens, rules are "techniques or generalizable procedures applied in 
the enactment/reproduction of social practices."14 Bhaskar then differentiates between 
regulative and constitutive rules by writing, "a rule normally tells us only what forms of 
action are possible (if it is constitutive) or permissible (if it is regulative)."15 Thus, while 
regulative rules specify what type of action is allowed or expected under given 
circumstances, constitutive rules "create or define new forms of behavior" by providing 
social action with meaning.16 To illustrate this distinction, it is helpful to consider a card 
game such as pinochle. While the regulative rules require that players must follow suit, 
the constitutive rules signify that a player making a low opening bid has a weak hand.
To understand the significance of rationalism's paradigmatic limitation concerning 
the study of rules, it is useful to contrast the difference between explanations of social and 
natural actions. In the natural sciences, the scientist can depend exclusively on the analysis 
of the regulative rules of physics to explain why a tree fell in the forest. However, to
13Friedrich Kratochwil, "Norms Versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the 
Rationalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions - a Unilateral Plea for 
Communicative Rationality," in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis o f an 
Institutional Form, Johh G. Ruggie, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
460.
14 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f Society (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 21.
l5Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility o f Naturalism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1979), 184.
16David Dessler, "What's at stake in the agent-structure debate?" International 
Organization (Summer, 1989): 455.
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explain why a man cut a tree down in the forest, the scientist would have to consider the
constitutive rules as well. Without such analysis, the scientist would not be able to
explore the meaning and intention behind the man's action.17
For this reason, Kratochwil argues that "causal explanations within the action-
perspective are fundamentally different from the causes of nature. This creates difficulties
in explaining human actions, if done purely in physicalist terms."18 To illustrate this point,
Kratochwil uses the following example:
Describing the opening of a door by means of physical movements and 
physiological processes does not tell us whether what happened was a random 
action, was done in order to let fresh air into the room, was a gesture of politeness, 
or was intended to signal for another person to leave the room. Meaningful action 
is created by placing an action within an intersubjectively understood context, even 
if such imputations are problematic or even "wrong" in terms of their predictive 
capacity.19
Accordingly, to understand why a particular social action occurred, it is necessary to look 
at the constitutive as well as the regulative rules. For this reason, the social scientist must 
problematize the normative context by exploring the underlying constitutive rules that 
provide social action with meaning. Only by studying the constitutive rules that link social 
action with meaning can the social scientist uncover the meaningful intentions that had
17Of course, this example grossly oversimplifies the distinction between regulative 
and constitutive rules. As Dessler points out, rules can often function both "regulatively" 
and "constitutively" at the same time. For example, the man might have cut down the tree 
because of a peculiar town ordinance which commanded him to do so. In such a case, 
though, it would still be important to consider how such a "regulative" ordinance also 
functioned "constitutively."
18Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Actions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 24.
19Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Actions, 24 .
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originally led the actor to take a particular course of action and explain why that action 
occurred.
In this sense, the constitutive rules embedded in the system's structure make social 
action possible by enabling states to identify the meaningful action that reflects their 
original intentions and by providing an intersubjective framework of shared knowledge 
within which that action can be understood by others. And, at the same time, the 
constitutive rules underlying norms can also shape action by constituting states with 
interests and identities that, in turn, influence preference structures.
CHAPTER II
CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE STUDY OF NORMS
In explaining the mode of military intervention in the Gulf conflict, a "reflective"20 
approach such as constructivism, which emphasizes the ideas and the meanings that are 
constitutive of social action, is best suited to studying the role that norms played in the 
construction of interests and identities. By acknowledging the importance of both the 
regulative and constitutive dimensions of rules, constructivism can explore the dynamic 
social structure of intersubjective understandings and knowledgeable practices in which 
state action is embedded. Thus, only by moving beyond rationalism’s narrow conception 
of process and acknowledging the importance of the constitutive meanings that shape 
knowledgeable practices and constitute subjects can we begin to explore the full role that 
norms played in the Gulf conflict.
While constructivism builds its theories upon many of the same auxiliary 
assumptions of neorealism and neo-liberalism,21 it differentiates itself from traditional 
rationalist approaches through its fundamental assertion that structure is "socially
20Keohane, "International Institutions."
21The constructivist approach taken in this thesis and by many scholars, for 
example, attempts to explain international politics through a "statist" lens which 
acknowledges the international system's lack of a.centralized authority.
13
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constructed." Specifically, constructivism posits that the structure of the international 
system is comprised of three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and the 
practices by which the structure is perpetuated. Structure is no longer strictly comprised 
of its material components, but of its social relationships as well.22
This ontological shift transfers attention from material variables such as the 
distribution of military capabilities to social elements such as intersubjective 
understandings, shared knowledge and the rules that constitute and regulate meaningful 
practices. And, while constructivism still considers structure's material components to be 
important, it is only because the structure's social dimension provides its material 
components with meaning. Structure then constitutes actors with identities and interests, 
thereby enabling social action to occur and shaping its form. And, at the 
same time, structure is affected by the very practices and discourse that it makes 
possible.23
Literature Review
To better understand how constructivism informs the research and analysis 
presented in this thesis, it is useful to highlight the differences that separate various strands 
of constructivism and to clarify the particular approach that this thesis takes. In doing so,
22Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 
(Summer, 1995).
23Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73-76. For a good discussion of 
the ontological importance of rules within the constructivists' conception of structure, see 
Dessler's, "What's at stake in the agent-structure debate."
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this section will review the work of several "modem" constructivists, including Nicholas 
Onuf, Alexander Wendt and David Dessler.24
Constmctivism springs from critical theory's criticism of positivist-informed 
research programs for their assumption that the world operates according to a set of 
natural, enduring laws that exist independently of human action and, that by emulating the 
natural sciences, positivism can lead to the discovery of those laws. Instead, 
constructivists give far greater credence to the power of human agency to change the state 
of its existence, perhaps for the better, by arguing that both reality and our knowledge of it 
are socially constructed.
Despite starting from this common premise, several subtle yet important 
differences do separate the modem constructivist explanations of reality. To help clarify 
this distinction, it is useful to contrast Onuf, Wendt and Dessler's positions in the 
philosophical context of the nominalist/realist dichotomy.25 Nominalism argues that 
"things exist only insofar as they are named as such," implying that both our knowledge of 
the world and the world itself is constructed wholly out of mind and, thereby, denying the 
existence of an independent, material reality.26 At the other end of the spectrum, realism
24Thus, this literature review will be restricted to those strands of constructivism 
which remain committed to the "modem" value of explaining international politics through 
the construction of theory.
25It is important to note that the term "realism" does not directly refer to
mainstream realist or neorealist approaches to International Relations. For further 
discussion on this dichotomy, see Nicholas G. Onuf, World o f Our Making: Rules and 
Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1989), 37-38.
26Onuf, 37.
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holds that there does exist an independent, material world, and that through objective 
observation and deduction, we can construct knowledge to explain how that world 
operates.27 Constructivist approaches, which point to a social and material content to all 
knowledge, then fall at various places between these two extremes.
In criticizing positivist epistemologies, the constructivism of Nicholas Onuf falls 
the furthest away from the realist perception of reality. In A World o f Our Making, Onuf 
questions the assumedly durable and unalterable foundations of knowledge upon which 
positivism erects its conceptual frameworks and builds its theories. Instead of treating 
such knowledge as fixed and given points of departure, Onuf argues that ’’the ground itself 
is but the rubble of construction."28 Social inquiry must then go further and consider the 
origins of knowledge.
Onuf s constructivism therefore begins with Faust's first principle, "In the beginning 
was the deed."29 Accordingly, because we cannot know anything about the actual material 
world until we begin to name its features, deeds — as defined both as acts taken and words 
spoken — are the building blocks of the social construction of knowledge. Through these 
deeds, Onuf argues that people and societies construct, or co-constitute each other and, 
therefore, all knowledge is socially constructed. "Human beings, with whatever 
equipment nature and/or society provides, construct society, and society is indispensable
27For example, nominalism would include the work of many post-modernists, 
whereas rationalist approaches such as neorealism and neo-liberalism remain committed to 
what Onuf refers to as the "realist" perspective.
280nuf, 35.
290nuf, 36.
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to the actualization of whatever human beings may "naturally'' be; society constructs 
human beings out of the raw material of nature."30
By starting with deeds, Onuf "denies priority to either the word or the world. . . A 
’deed' is intelligible only as jointly a social construction and a natural event, produced by 
mind yet phenomenal in its own right."31 This does not necessarily deny the existence of 
an objective, independent material reality, but rather, suggests that "we can never know 
the features of that world independent of discourse about it. Even if some features of the 
real world are independent, we cannot, in our discourse dependency, know which ones 
they are. . . We construct worlds we know in a world we do not."32
Thus, Onuf refuses to draw a sharp distinction between material and social 
realities. Instead, he argues that the two contaminate the other - but variably - and, 
although he grants neither world "sovereignty" over the other, he does find the socially 
constructed world dominant. Onuf is therefore critical of any knowledge claims that rest 
on the existence of an independent, objective state of reality. Instead, Onuf s research 
focusses more on the social constructions that we do know, leading his research to take on 
a highly critical edge in the pursuit of knowledge.
In contrast to Onuf s quasi-nominalist view of reality, constructivist approaches 
that build on the principles of scientific realism fall much closer towards the philosophical 
view of the realists. Instead of blurring the distinction between the material and the social,
30Onuf, 46.
31Onuf, 43.
320nuf, 38.
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scientific realism keeps the two conceptually distinct by expanding its underlying ontology 
to explicitly include aspects of both the material and the social.33 Thus, not only do 
scientific realists acknowledge the existence of an independent material world, but they 
grant that world an important ontological role in the construction of theory.
Accordingly, scientific realism "points to a socially made content to all knowledge, 
including scientific knowledge, without repudiating the material reality to which 
knowledge relates."34 This then has important epistemological consequences. By 
acknowledging the possibility of obtaining objective knowledge about reality as it 
independently exists, scientific realists are able to explain international politics through the 
falsification of theory against empirical evidence. In this sense, scientific realist-informed 
constructivists distinguish themselves from more "critical" strains of constructivism 
through their commitment to a conventional scientific epistemology.35
Scientific realist epistemologies are still able to distinguish themselves from 
mainstream positivist approaches, though, through their insistence that science be "driven 
by questions rather than methods."36 As Wendt points out, this triggers an epistemological 
shift in the construction of theory. Instead of leading social scientists to search for 
universal laws from observable phenomenon, constructivism urges scholars to "think
33For example, Wendt's conception of structure includes both social relationships 
and material capabilities and Dessler's conception combines both rules and resources.
340nuf, 40.
35Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 75.
36Ian Shapiro and Alexander Wendt, "The Difference that Realism Makes: Social 
Science and the Politics of Consent," Politics and Society (June, 1992): 212.
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'abductively' about 'causal mechanisms' to build their theories... This methodological 
prescription is inherently "critical" since it requires a critique and penetration of observable 
forms to the underlying social structures which generate them. "37
This implies that social scientists should not focus their research exclusively on the 
explanation of behavior that has actually occurred, but rather, also ask "How is action X 
possible?" and "Why did X happen rather than Y?" so as to explore the range of 
possibilities that can happen. Accordingly, state behavior is treated as "problematic" and 
not simply accepted as given.38 A constructivist, then, would not ask how norms 
constrained the actions of a given actor in the Gulf War, but rather, how were subjects 
constituted and interests constructed such that a given action was made possible.
Scientific realist-informed constructivism includes the work of Alexander Wendt 
and David Dessler. In "The Agent-Structure Problem," Wendt argues that structuration 
theory, as developed from scientific realism, leads social scientists to recognize that social 
structures cannot exist independently of the activities of its constitutive units. Rather, the 
social structure that emerges from the interaction of its units will only continue to exist so 
long as those units continue to interact. Structuration theory, then, "conceptualizes agents 
and structures as mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities. Each is in some 
sense an effect of the other; they are 'co-determined.'39 Social structures are the result of
37Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory," International Organization (Summer, 1987): 370.
38Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem," 362-3.
39By conceptualizing the material and the social as "mutually constitutive," it could 
be argued that Wendt is building a bridge between Onuf and scientific realism.
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the intended and unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions 
presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context.'*40
In a later article, "Anarchy is what states make of it," Wendt attempts to break 
down neorealist justifications for ignoring identity and interest-formation processes in 
international politics by questioning the causal powers of anarchy. Specifically, he 
contends that self-help and power politics are socially constructed institutions and are not 
exogenously given in anarchy. For Waltz to argue that self-help is a constitutive feature of 
anarchy "presuppose[s] a history of interaction in which actors have acquired 'selfish' 
identities and interests; before interaction. . .they would have no experience upon which 
to base such, definitions of self and other. To assume otherwise is to attribute to states in 
the state of nature qualities that they can only possess in society."41
States therefore do not begin with either self-regarding or collective identities. 
Rather, Wendt posits that identities and interests are socially constructed through process 
and, accordingly, are endogenous to interaction.42 In doing so, Wendt gains the powerful 
theoretical argument that the institutions of anarchy and self-help as they exist today need 
not necessarily constrain state actions. Because such institutions have been made by 
human agency, they can be remade by human agency. Through the creation of 
cooperative norms and institutions, process and interaction can lead to a transformation of
40Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem," 360.
41Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," 402.
42Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 
American Political Science Review (June, 1994): 384.
21
identities and interests.
In addition to Wendt, Dessler also presents a scientific realist-informed 
constructivist approach which challenges exclusively material conceptions of structure. In 
the article, ’’What's at stake in the agent-structure debate?’’ Dessler argues that ontological 
limitations prevent Waltzian neorealism from acknowledging the powers of human agency 
in shaping outcomes. Specifically, neorealism's narrow definition of structure only 
provides a material cause of behavior, which in and of itself, cannot explain state action.
He then goes on to advocate the adoption of a transformational model of international 
politics because it acknowledges the importance of the social construction of rules in 
shaping action.
He takes as his starting point Bhaskar’s premise that "all social activity 
presupposes the prior existence of social forms."43 Otherwise social activity would have 
no form to take and could not exist. This then suggests that two important connections 
exist between action and structure. "First, structure both enables action and constrains its 
possibilities. Second, structure is the outcome as well as the medium of action."44 To help 
illustrate this concept, it is useful to consider the example of language. Just as language 
structures what we say and how we say it, it is the process of communicating that 
constitutes the structure of language, giving it its form and shaping its very existence.
However, simply positing that structure is the medium of action does not 
necessarily imply that all, or even any, social action is capable of transforming that
43Dessler, 451.
^Dessler, 452.
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structure. As Waltz would contend, systemic constraints could ensure that any such 
action would only lead to the reproduction of the structure.45 Thus, such claims only open 
the possibility that social action can potentially transform the structure and lead to change.
This leads Dessler to take a closer look at structure. Defined simply as the social 
forms that pre-exist action, scientific realism argues that structure must include two forms 
of instruments before social action can be made possible: resources (which provide the 
material means for action) and rules (which gives that action social meaning). Otherwise, 
resources alone only provide structure with a material cause of action, which by itself can 
only explain the possibilities of action.46
Drawing upon Bhaskar's conception of the duality of praxis, Dessler then argues 
that "rules that are normally unconsciously reproduced through intended action can 
themselves become the objects of intentional action."47 This empowers the agent by 
enabling it to either reproduce or transform the material conditions of action. From this
45As the neo-realists argue, anarchy and the system of self-help require all states to 
pursue power and security. If states fail to do so, they will either be banished from the 
system or destroyed. On these grounds the neo-realists justify the subordination of all 
other national interests to the overriding goal of self-preservation, thereby precluding 
alternate courses of action that could potentially transform the structure from being taken. 
For further explanation, see Waltz's, Theory o f International Politics.
^Note that this leads Dessler to a somewhat different resolution to the agent- 
structure problem than Wendt and Onuf. Whereas Wendt argues that agent and structure 
are mutually constitutive and Onuf that material and social realities contaminate each 
other, Dessler draws on Bhaskar's analogy which likens the agent to a sculptor who is 
creating a product from the materials (structure) available to him/her. In this case, agent 
and structure are not "two moments of the same process' but 'radically different kind of 
things," thereby leading Dessler to remain truer than Wendt to the core tenets of scientific 
realism. See Dessler, 452.
47Dessler, 461
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perspective, man's social existence is no longer governed by a set of externally given laws 
and rules that are impervious to change, but rather, by a set of socially constructed rules 
that are susceptible to intentional transformation by the powers of human agency.
The brand of constructivism that this thesis employs runs much closer to the 
approaches outlined by Wendt and Dessler. Specifically, this approach employs a 
conventional, scientific epistemology to explain observable behavior in the Gulf by 
exploring the social content of an independent, objective reality. This has important 
consequences for the study of norms. Instead of treating norms simply as "reasons" for 
action,48 the constructivist approach adopted by this thesis allows for a more rigorous 
investigation of norms by treating them as "causes" that shape action.49 This places heavy 
emphasis on the exploration of empirical evidence to either support or refute the 
constructivist assertion that ideas and meanings shape interaction and behavior.
48For a good discussion of norms as "reasons," see Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and 
Actions.
49This does not mean to suggest that norms provide states with the initial impulse 
to act, or even that norms "motivate" action. Rather, norms simply cause action to take a 
particular form. This thereby locates the causal locus of norms to reside in the "shaping" 
of the action.
CHAPTER III
MULTILATERALISM AND THE NORM OF COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION
Before exploring the role that norms of military intervention played in the 
construction of interests and identities in the Gulf conflict, it is first necessary to 
understand how those norms were instantiated through past practices and became 
embedded in the system's social structure. Specifically, this section will briefly look at the 
increasing role that multilateral arrangements have played in coordinating international 
efforts to resolve conflicts through collective actions.
Ruggie defines multilateralism as "an institutional form that coordinates relations 
among three or more states pn the basis of generalized principles of conduct."50 
Specifically, multilateral arrangements coordinate relations between states on the 
principles of non-discrimination, the indivisibility of interests such as peace and stability, 
and expectations of diffuse reciprocity. Thus, what sets multilateralism apart from other 
institutional forms is the kinds of relations that exist between states.
A central component of multilateral arrangements, then, is the willingness of states 
to forego opportunities for short-term gain through defection in the expectation that
50John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in 
Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis o f an Institutional Form, John G. 
Ruggie, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 11.
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compliance with generalized principles would eventually yield a greater long-term return. 
Thus, states must perceive their own interests to be linked with the interests of the group. 
This is in large part why Ruggie argues that multilateralism is such a "highly demanding 
institutional form."51 States must abide by generalized principles of conduct and not gear 
their actions to "the particularlist interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that 
may exist,"52 even when this means sacrificing short-term gains.
Applied specifically to collective security regimes, the generalized principles of 
conduct coordinating security relations have historically embodied the norm of collective 
intervention. This does not necessarily suggest that all such interventions have been 
composed of multinational forces. Rather, generalized principles of conduct such as 
expectations of difluse reciprocity and the indivisibility of peace have called upon states to 
act through multilateral channels and collective decision-making apparati before taking 
military action. Accordingly, states are expected to pass up opportunities to reap short 
term gains through the "hand-crafting" of interventionary practices to the state's unilateral 
designs.
Historically, elements of multilateralism can be found in security regimes such as 
the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, the United Nations and NATO. All of 
these institutions are, to varying degrees, collective security regimes based upon the
51Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 12.
52Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 11.
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concept of "all for one and one for all."53 And, accordingly, all of these structures are 
based upon generalized principles of conduct, which call on states to work through 
multilateral channels before taking military action.
The nineteenth century Concert of Europe, comprised of the major European 
powers in the years following the Napoleonic wars, was created to maintain international 
peace and stability. As Jervis points out, the Concert was marked by a surprisingly broad 
conception of self-interest, based largely upon the willingness of its members to forego 
individual short-term gains in the expectation that compliance with generalized principles 
would provide a greater return in the form of stability and order.54 In addition to 
expectations of diffuse reciprocity, the major powers based decisions on the principle of 
non-discrimination and perceived peace and order to be indivisible.55 However, as Ruggie 
argues, the Concert's occasional reliance on ad hoc bilateral agreements often left its 
multilateral elements to play only a marginal role in actual practice.56
Multilateral arrangements would come to play a larger role in the shaping and 
defining of security relations with the advent of "conference diplomacy" in the twentieth
53For a further discussion of collective security mechanisms, see Charles A. and 
Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," 
International Security 16 (Summer 1991).
54Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in International Regimes, Stephen Krasner, 
ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
55For an excellent discussion of the Concert of Europe, see Henry Kissinger, A
World Restored; Mettemich, Castlereagh and the Problems o f Peace, 1812-22 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
56Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 22.
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century.57 Like the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations 
were based upon the principles of diffuse reciprocity and the indivisibility of peace. 
However, these two twentieth century organizations took multilateralism one step further 
by opening membership to all states regardless of considerations of power and influence.
The League of Nations represented an idealistic strand of collective security in 
which all members were given a voice in the institution's decision-making process. When 
the League failed to prevent World War II, the international community subsequently 
founded the United Nations, which compromised the idealism of the League by giving 
special powers to five major powers through the creation of the Security Council. Both 
the League and the United Nations, though, created open forums for states to discuss 
international matters and settle conflicts peacefully.
Additionally, the United States and its western allies created the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization to provide its members with collective security. Instead of linking 
together a series of bilateral security treaties, which would have enabled the U.S. to 
maximize its particularlistic interests on a state by state basis, NATO was formed on the 
basis of generalized multilateral principles. First and foremost, peace and security was 
considered to be indivisible.58 And, although the organizational structure of NATO gave 
the United States disproportionate powers in the decision-making processes, all nations
57Volker Rittberger, "Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-
Making," European Journal o f Political Research 11:2 (1983).
58Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 27.
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were still expected to confer with the group before resorting to uses of military force.59
Thus, at the center of these four security regimes was the expectation that states 
would abide by generalized principles of conduct and refrain from making decisions that 
could threaten international stability independent of the collectivity. Specifically, the 
principles of non-discrimination, diffuse reciprocity and the indivisibility of peace 
coordinated relations and called upon states to work through multilateral channels. This 
expectation held especially true for matters regarding the question of military intervention.
By the end of the 1980's, the norm of collective action, which called on states to 
act through multilateral organizations before taking military action, had been strengthened 
sufficiently to affect international standards for acceptable behavior. As Lori Damrosch 
and David Scheffer argue, the collapse of the Brezhnev and Reagan doctrines created new 
opportunities for international law pertaining to the use of force -- particularly, laws 
found in documents such as the UN Charter which largely prohibited forceful unilateral 
measures — to play a greater role in international politics.60 And, as several chapters in 
Damrosch and Scheffer's book reveal, the strengthening of the norm of collective 
intervention has coincided with increased possibilities for further clarifying and limiting
59 Although the multilateral elements of NATO ^ gradually receded as the United 
States came to play a more dominant role in the organization in the 1960's, NATO was at 
least founded on multilateral principles. For a more detailed discussion, see Steve Weber, 
"Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," in Multilateralism 
Matters: The Theory and Praxis o f an Institutional Form, John G. Ruggie, ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
^ o r i  F. Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, "Preface," in Law and Force in the New 
International Order, Lori F. Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, ed. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), ix-x.
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acceptable uses of unilateral force61
Similarly, Martha Finnemore argues that, with the end of the Cold War, the 
spheres of influence system ceased to legitimate superpower efforts to stabilize regional 
problems by means of unilateral intervention. Instead, the current system that has since 
arisen calls on the "international community," and more specifically, multilateral 
organizations such as the UN, to respond to international and local problems.
Accordingly, when local or regional disputes threaten order and stability, outside parties 
can only legitimately respond collectively.62 Thus, one common thread that ties together 
much of the literature on the post-Cold War order is the denunciation of achieving 
objectives through forceful, unilateral means. By the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
norms advocating multilateral decision-making processes and collective action had already 
begun to influence states' perceptions of interests and constitute state behavior.
61For example, see the chapters written by Abram Chayes, Oscar Schachter and 
David J. Scheffer in Law and Force in the New International Order. Lori Fisler 
Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
62Martha Finnemore, Changing Patterns o f Military Intervention (Unpublished 
paper, March 9, 1995), 24.
CHAPTER IV
NORMS OF INTERVENTION AND THE GULF WAR CASE STUDY
In exploring the relationship between norms and the construction of interests and 
identities in the Gulf conflict, the following section analyzes pre-war discourse in the 
United Nations Security Council and the media from the time of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990 to the UN-sponsored intervention on 16 January 1991. The 
first section shows that the international community perceived the multilateral channels of 
the United Nations as providing the most appropriate means of responding to Iraqi 
aggression. The second section breaks down norms of military intervention by looking at 
the intersubjective meanings that constitute various modes of intervention and enabled a 
collective intervention to occur. The final section explores how intersubjective 
understandings of norms shaped the construction of interests and identities in the Gulf.
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CHAPTER V
PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMATE FORMS OF ACTION IN THE GULF
In the days that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the members of the 
international community viewed the multilateral channels of the United Nations to be the 
most appropriate framework for resolving the Gulf Crisis. Both Kuwait and the United 
States immediately responded to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf by calling for an emergency 
session of the Security Council. In addition, numerous other letters calling for a swift 
multilateral response to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf were also sent over the next several 
days by the following nations: Italy on behalf of the European Community, Japan, Iran, 
Uruguay, Oman on behalf of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Cambodia, Germany, South Africa, Qatar on behalf of the League of Arab States, and 
Madagascar.63
During the Security Council's first meeting on 2 August 1990, various members of 
the international community affirmed the belief that the international community needed to 
respond to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf multilaterally. The United States emphasized its 
attempts to rally the support of the Arab states behind the international community in 
resolving the conflict. "We have been in touch with many States in the region in an effort
63United Nations, Security Council, 1990, S/21423-4, 21426-21435.
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to seek their additional support for the action of the international community to bring
about an end to this heinous act of the use of military force, contrary to the Charter,
international law, and all the fully accepted norms of international behavior."64
Following the United States, Representative Tickell from the United Kingdom
expressed the belief that the multilateral channels of the United Nations provided the most
appropriate means for dealing with the conflict. "The Security Council represents a focus
of world opinion. It is the way in which the international community can mobilize itself to
maintain the purposes and ideals of the Charter and ensure that acts of this kind do not
succeed."65 The United Kingdom reaffirmed this belief in the necessity of acting
multilaterally in an 6 August session of the Security Council :
What should the international community do in such circumstances? Some 
Governments have already taken action. The 12 member countries of the 
European Community have already done so. But individual action by States or 
groups of States is not sufficient; we need a framework for international action, 
and we have it today in the form of the draft resolution.66
Here a realist might suggest that the very fact that some nations had begun to
simultaneously take unilateral action might undermine any arguments that suggest a norm
of multilateralism had already developed. However, the important point to remember is
that the international community still perceived multilateral action to provide the most
appropriate response to Iraqi aggression and to offer the greatest chances of resolving the
conflict peacefully.
^United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2932, 1990: 14-15.
65United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2932, 1990: 21.
^United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 26.
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During the same meeting, the representative from Romania made a similar 
statement. "My Government reiterates its stand that the only way to settle disputes and 
iron out misunderstandings among States lies in negotiations and in resorting to the 
procedures provided by the Charter of the United Nations."67
On 9 August, Representative Lozinsky of the Soviet Union stated, "We wish to 
remind everyone once again that the Soviet Union is against reliance on force and against 
unilateral decisions. The experience of many years has proved that the surest and wisest 
way to act in conflict situations is through collective efforts, using to the full all the 
potential of the United Nations."68
The representative from Colombia echoed these beliefs shortly thereafter. With 
respect to supporting Resolution 662 (1990), Representative Castano said, "We did so 
because we believe that the Security Council must continue to play the leading and salient 
role it has played so far in the search for a peaceful solution to this conflict, which affects 
the world."69
Following the passage of Resolution 665 (1990) on 25 August, the United States 
once again stressed its belief in responding multilaterally and called for the international 
community to support the collective efforts of the international coalition. "The United 
States has vigorously sought and fully supports collective efforts to respond to this crisis.
67United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 53
68United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2934, 1990: 12.
69United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2934, 1990: 28.
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It supports collective efforts to enforce the trade sanctions strictly."70
Statements made by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in a 24 August press
conference concerning the implementation of sanctions further stressed the importance of
maintaining international and collective support:
We are working very hard to get a fresh resolution, not because we ourselves or 
the Americans or the French are in any doubt about the legal basis of what our 
ships are doing at the present, but we want to get accepted by everybody the 
absolute need and legality of enforcing the blockade. There has been some delay, 
some delay designed to accommodate and bring along the Soviet Union whose 
consent is needed for such a resolution. I hope very much this delay will not be 
prolonged. I think it is reasonable to make a substantial effort, which we are 
doing, to carry the Russians with us and I am in direct touch with Mr. 
Shevardnadze on this subject. But it is very important to get this resolution. . .
So the discussions in New York are not of an empty, ritualistic kind. We have no 
doubt, the Americans have no doubt, about the legal basis on which our ships 
operate, but we are anxious that that basis should be accepted by everybody, that it 
should clearly be with the authority of the UN and with the terms agreed by the 
UN that these operations take place. That is why it is both urgent and important 
that the Security Council should reach a conclusion as soon as possible on a new 
resolution.71
Thus, even though the legality of the sanctions was already assured, thereby opening the 
possibility for the United States and its allies to legitimately take unilateral action, the 
leaders of the coalition still felt they needed to put forward a "substantial effort" to pass a 
resolution which would reflect the will of the international community and gain collective 
support. Although a realist might counter this interpretation by pointing out that the 
United States and its allies had already moved forward unilaterally to implement sanctions,
70United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 29-30.
71Lauterpacht, E., ed. The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents. Vol. 1, Cambridge 
International Documents Series (Cambridge, England: Grotius Publications Limited, 
1991), 252.
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thereby undermining the collective nature of the coalition, securing the support of the
international community was still viewed as "urgent and important" and not "of an empty,
ritualistic kind" because it was seen as a necessary step in empowering the sanctions and
maximizing its efficiency.
Other nations also emphasized the need to act multilaterally. While considering
draft resolution 21774 concerning Iraqi violations of diplomatic norms, the representative
of Malaysia made it clear that its approval of the resolution (which would become 667)
should only be viewed as authorizing collective measures. "Malaysia interprets the
significance of operative paragraph 6 as a collective determination to continue to take
action through the Security Council of the United Nations and not unilaterally."72 In
Argentina's 19 September letter to the United Nations announcing its decision to send
troops to the Gulf in accordance with resolution 665, the representative of Argentina
further demonstrated the belief that the international community should respond
collectively through the United Nations to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf:
The Argentine Republic thereby affirms its traditional position of support for 
United Nations decisions and for all initiatives conducive to the solution of 
international conflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Organization. In keeping with that position, the Argentine Government trusts that 
the Security Council resolutions on the current crisis in the Gulf will be fully 
complied with, since they constitute the sole internationally acceptable framework 
for the peaceful and just resolution of this problem.73
In the 25 September session of the Security Council, Canada also voiced its support for
maintaining the United Nation's central role in the resolution of the conflict. "Canada
72United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2940, 1990: 12.
73Lauterpacht, 252.
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views this body [the Security Council] as the principal instrument of collective 
international action to ensure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait."74
Two days later, the United States Congress issued joint resolution 658, which 
articulated the belief that the United States should continue to seek international support 
and work through the multilateral channels of the United Nations. Specifically, it 
recommended that the United States should continue its efforts to:
(1) strengthen the international consensus against Iraq's aggression, 
through broadening cooperation with the Soviet Union, other members of the 
international community, and the United Nations;
(2) obtain additional and substantial commitments of air, sea, and ground 
forces from other nations in support of the multinational forces deployed in the 
Persian Gulf region in response to Iraq's aggression;
(3) obtain increased financial assistance and other support from other 
nations for those multinational forces;
(4) obtain substantial tangible international assistance for those nations 
that have suffered financial losses as a result of their support for the United 
Nations trade embargo against Iraq; and
(5) obtain adequate international humanitarian assistance for those foreign 
nationals who have fled Iraq and Kuwait."75
Not only does this Congressional resolution emphasize the importance of gaining 
international support for U.S. activity in the Gulf, but more importantly, it reveals the 
United States' preference for securing multinational economic and military support to 
resolve the situation.
In fact, the norm of collective action continued to influence perceptions of
74United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2943, 1990: 37.
75Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms 
Control, International Security and Science, The Persian Gulf Crisis: Relevant 
Documents, Correspondence, Reports (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 
1991), 18.
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acceptable and appropriate methods of conflict resolution right through the deliberations
until the passage of Resolution 667 (1990) authorizing ’’the use of all necessary means."76
During this historic session of the Security Council on 29 November, Representative Abu
Hassan of Malaysia once again stressed the importance of interpreting the resolution solely
as an authorization for multilateral and collective action. "We have not agreed to any
attempt unilaterally to apply Article 51 of the Charter once the Security Council is seized
of the matter. In this regard, we have always insisted on the centrality of the United
Nations' role in the maintenance of international peace and security."77 Additionally, the
representative from Romania stated:
We continue to believe that every effort should be made to ease the existing 
tension politically and to solve the issues at stake by peaceful means, in accordance 
with the resolutions of the Security Council.
The most appropriate framework in that regard is the United Nations. 
Consequently, all efforts should be directed towards making full use of the 
potential of the Charter and the resources offered by it.78
Thus, throughout the conflict, the international community believed that any
response to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf should be formulated through a multilateral
decision-making process. Additionally, the community remained committed to its
conviction that any unilateral decisions to take action in the Gulf by any states would not
be acceptable.
76United Nations, Security Council, S/21969.
77United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2963, 1990: 76.
78United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2963, 1990: 97.
CHAPTER VI
CONSTITUTIVE RULES AND THE MODE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
To understand why the intervening states perceived the mode of collective 
intervention as providing the most appropriate form of action in responding to Iraqi 
aggression in the Gulf, we must look at the constitutive rules underpinning the norm of 
collective intervention to uncover the meaning that links the intentions of the international 
community with the action in the Gulf. The following section therefore problematizes 
norms of military intervention by exploring their underlying constitutive rules to explain 
how intersubjective understandings of those norms enabled action to occur in the Gulf. 
Specifically, the constitutive rules of collective and unilateral military intervention provide 
each action with three normatively-charged meanings. First, they attach three negative 
meanings to the mode of unilateral intervention: exploiting the common interests of the 
international community for the pursuit of selfish, material interests; recklessly 
endangering international peace and stability; and, taking unauthorized action. 
Additionally, the constitutive rules attach three positive meanings to the mode of 
collective intervention: defending the collective interests of the international community; 
stabilizing a potentially volatile situation; and, acting under the authority of the 
international community.
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To begin, the international community associates the mode of unilateral
intervention with the reckless pursuit of the state's individual material interests. During
the 6 August session of the Security Council, the Kuwaiti representative argued that Iraq's
actions in the Gulf were illegitimate because Iraq sought to further its own interests at the
expense of Kuwait:
We had hoped that the brutal invading Power would heed the will of the 
international community and particularly the unprecedented unanimous and strong 
international condemnation. . . No one has agreed to co-operate with the usurper 
aiid aggressor. The aim of this invasion can also be seen in hegemony over 
Kuwait's resources, their domination, plunder and looting. The objectives of the 
invasion are based on expansionism, as seen in Iraq's threats and consequent 
attacks against neighboring countries following its threats and its blackmail.''79
Kuwait's statement links international condemnation of Iraq's unilateral invasion with the
"usurper's" and the "aggressor's" "hegemonic" and "expansionist" aspirations. This
suggests that the constitutive rules of military intervention attach a negative meaning to
unilateral intervention. Specifically, the international community associates unilateral
intervention with the aggressive pursuit of individual interests at the expense of the
interests of the larger community of states. For this reason, the constitutive rules branded
Iraq's actions as illegitimate at the normative level because those actions violated
intersubjective understandings of justice, thereby making some form of international action
imperative.
Following Kuwait, arguments posed by the United States further indicated that the 
constitutive rules attach to unilateral action this negative meaning of the selfish pursuit of 
material interests. "By his actions, Saddam Hussein has plunged into crisis the
79United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 6-7.
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strategically critical area of the Persian Gulf. Thirty per cent of the region’s oil production
is now under Iraqi control, thus threatening international economic health and stability."80
Thus, the United States based its criticism of Iraq on the grounds that it had sacrificed the
collective interests of the international community -- specifically, international health and
stability ~ for the pursuit of its own material interests.
Ironically, Cuba's attack during the 6 August session of the Security Council on
the U.S. response supports this constitutive meaning of unilateral intervention:
Furthermore, the draft resolution suffers from other defects that my delegation 
feels obliged to mention. To begin with, we are asked to approve specific 
sanctions that have already been imposed unilaterally by the principal developed 
Powers of the world. . .
Is the defense of the legitimate interests of the Kuwaiti Government really the 
concern that has led the United States delegation to act as it is doing now, or is it 
the hegemonic and interventionist ambitions of the United States in the Middle 
East?81
Cuba began in the first paragraph by questioning the legitimacy of the draft resolution by 
suggesting that its collective nature had been undermined by the unilateral measures 
already taken by the United States and its allies. However, simply arguing that the mode 
of intervention was unilateral does not necessarily constitute a violation of international 
norms. Unilateral military action could be justifiable if it were perceived to be carried out 
by an agent of the international community working exclusively for the collective interests 
of the group. Thus, the legitimacy of the action depends in part upon the nature of the 
ends the international community perceives the action to be serving. Therefore, in the
80United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 16.
81United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 28-31.
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next paragraph, Cuba went on to explain why it perceived those unilateral actions to be 
illegitimate — because that unilateral action was being conducted primarily to further the 
individual interests and the interventionist ambitions of the United States.82
While discussing the passage of resolution 662 (1990), the United States argued 
in support of the resolution on the grounds that Iraqi aggression in the Gulf presented not 
just a unilateral threat to Kuwait, but a larger threat to the collective interests of the 
international community. "Iraq has repeatedly, over the past several days, shown its scorn 
for the international community and for the resolutions of this body. Iraq's declaration 
[that Kuwait was now part of Iraq] is further proof of its continuing threat to the world 
community and its disdain for international law."83
In explaining why Cuba chose to abstain from the voting on resolution 674 on 
October 29, its representative explained, "We believe that the Council cannot and must 
not, while adhering to that just position [of defending Kuwait's rights to independence and 
sovereignty] with regard to those principles, act as though we can accept the imposition of 
criteria and strategies devised solely for the benefit of certain Major Powers."84 This line 
of argument further reinforces the association between unilateral military action and the 
aggressive pursuit of self-serving interests and thereby explains why Cuba understands
82Although some might be skeptical of any insights that can be drawn from these 
arguments because of the questionable nature of Cuba's underlying political motives for 
attacking U.S. policy in the Gulf, the justifications it chooses for labelling the actions of 
the United States as "illegitimate" still reveal how Cuba perceives and understands 
international norms and standards of behavior to exist.
83United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2934, 1990: 7.
84United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2951, 1990: 68.
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such action to be illegitimate.
Conversely, just as unilateral intervention is negatively associated with the 
aggressive pursuit of self-serving interests, the constitutive rules of military action attaches 
a positive meaning to the mode of collective intervention. Specifically, the international 
community associates collective military action with serving the common good and the 
collective interests of the group. For this reason it is understood as legitimate and even 
desirable at the normative level.
During the 6 August session of the Security Council, the representative from 
France justified the passage of resolution 660 (J990) by linking the multilateral nature of 
the action with the defense of collective interests, such as peace, security, and the rule of 
law. "France gave unreserved support to resolution 660 (1990), adopted on 2 August by 
the Security Council. . . The magnitude of these measures is justified, in the view of my 
Government, because of the unacceptable nature of Iraq's military aggression, which "is a 
major violation of international law and a serious threat to international peace and 
security."85
In a letter sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30 August, Japan
announced that it would economically support the international coalition so that it might
contribute to the collective interests of the international community:
Japan will extend cooperation to the countries engaged in activities to restore 
peace and stability in the Gulf region in accordance with the related United Nations 
Security Council resolutions. The Japanese Government will allocate one billion 
dollars (US $1,000,000,000) from the budget of this fiscal year to the cooperation
85United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 21.
43
in support of activities aimed at restoring peace in the Gulf region. "86 
In making this announcement, Japan linked its support of the multilateral actions of the 
Security Council with specific reference to the common interests of maintaining peace and 
stability.
Comments made by the Malaysian representative at a 25 September session
illustrate the normative preference of collective over unilateral intervention by contrasting
the different meanings associated with each:
Malaysia, as a principle, is averse to the involvement of the armed forces of major 
Powers in any region. That we had to be a party to authorizing the use of forces 
of certain countries in respect of resolution 665 (199Q) does not sit easy with us. . . 
In a broader context, the collective manner in which the Council has reacted to the 
Gulf crisis has marked a revival of the concept of collective security and has raised 
hopes with regard to the role that the United Nations can play in the maintenance 
of international peace and security in the post-cold war era, which is just beginning 
to unfold.87
Malaysia understood that if the United Nations should take military action against Iraq, 
the United States would more than likely provide the vast majority of military power and 
play the central role in that intervention. For this reason, it felt extremely uneasy about 
authorizing this military action. And, under ordinary circumstances, the negative meaning 
that the constitutive rules of military intervention attach to the involvement of major 
powers would preclude Malaysia from ever supporting such interventionary practices.
Why then should Malaysia support the presence and activity of major power forces in the 
region when brought together through an international coalition? Because the military
86Lauterpacht, 187.
87United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2943, 1990: 62.
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action was no longer working towards the interests of the major powers, but rather,
toward the common interests of'international peace' and 'security.' It could even
potentially lead to the establishment of an effective collective security mechanism.
In a November session of the Security Council, Zaire argued that "the international
community and the members of the Security Council, motivated by the purposes of the
Charter and responsible for maintaining international peace and security, while
guaranteeing the political independence and territorial integrity of Member States of our
Organization, cannot tolerate this affront by a single Member State of the United
Nations."88 This statement reveals that Zaire associated the collective bodies of the
international community and the Security Council with the common interests of
"maintaining international peace and security," and therefore fueled the normative belief
that the Security Council should not "tolerate this affront," but should take action against
Iraq's unilateral invasion of Kuwait.
Finally, Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union reaffirmed this belief one last time
during the 29 November session of the Security Council:
We have been faced with the first extremely grave test of the post-cold war period, 
and we are coping with it, placing mankind's common interests at the centre of our 
policy and being guided by the principles of the new thinking in international 
affairs.. . It is of overriding importance that today we are no longer responding to 
these challenges in the same way as we did yesterday. We are giving preference to 
the law, to action under the authority of the Charter and of the Security Council, 
and to collective efforts. We have acted thus, collectively and in concert, through 
the long and difficult weeks of the Persian Gulf Crisis, and we are continuing to do 
so. We are right to act in this way.89
88United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2963, 1990: 47.
89United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2963, 1990, 89-92.
45
Through this statement, Shevardnadze clearly associated collective action under the 
Security Council with "mankind's common interests" and the preservation of international 
law. Additionally, he came right out in no uncertain terms and proclaimed his normative 
belief that collective action undertaken to preserve such common interests was the right 
thing to do.
In addition to attaching an interest-based meaning to the mode of military 
intervention, the constitutive rules also provide intervention with an additional meaning 
with respect to the level of hostility and escalation that the action will likely prompt. 
Specifically, intersubjective understandings of military intervention expect that unilateral 
action will lead to an escalation of the violence and a full-scale war, whereas, collective 
intervention provides a better opportunity to control the situation and minimize the 
bloodshed.
During the 6 August session of the Security Council, statements made by Malaysia
revealed an underlying belief that resolving the conflict peacefully required the
international community to respond collectively:
Malaysia's support for the draft resolution is not in any way designed to join in a 
punitive act, but to be part of the international community's resolve and 
determination to ensure that disputes between States are not settled on the basis of 
the use of force. Malaysia's support for the draft resolution is predicated on the 
premise that it will remove the prospect of any unilateral military or quasi-military 
action in the region by outside Powers. There should not be any justification to 
utilize the provisions of the draft resolution to take military action.
At a time when there are high hopes for a more effective role for the United 
Nations in maintaining peace and security around the world, the Security Council 
has a particularly heavy and serious responsibility in ensuring an early and peaceful 
end to the conflict. In this context, it is also the duty of the Council to ensure that 
the efforts to bring about the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi
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forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait 
are taken under the ambit of the United Nations and not unilaterally, to avoid 
escalation and greater turmoil.90
Of particular importance here, Malaysia stressed the need to avoid unilateral military
action on the grounds that it would jeopardize the chances for "ensuring an early and
peaceful end to the conflict." For this reason, Malaysia then reaffirmed its belief that the
Security Council needed to play the central role in the resolution of the situation so that it
might minimize the ability of individual states to recklessly pursue their own self interests.
To respond otherwise would have risked "escalation and greater turmoil."
Later on in that same session, comments* made by the representative from Cuba
revealed similar meanings attached to the mode of collective intervention. Framed around
the question of the legitimacy and appropriateness of the draft resolution, the
representative from Cuba argued that "the draft resolution would facilitate the
interventionist actions taking place in the region and being openly promoted and
proclaimed by the United States Government. The draft would also impede the current
actions and efforts of the Arab States to arrive at a solution. "91 Thus, implicit here is the
belief that unilateral intervention by the United States would undermine the Arab states'
ability to resolve the conflict peacefully.
Cuba further touched on this belief during the 9 August session of the Security
Council in which it warned against the United States assuming unilateral control of the
situation:
90United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 22.
91United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 38.
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I feel duty bound to repeat what I have felt obliged to repeat constantly: our 
profound conviction that the Security Council and the international community 
must act energetically and promptly to prevent the conflict from becoming 
exacerbated and from spreading. We cannot ignore the obvious fact that certain 
Powers are taking unilateral measures that are not in accordance with the decision 
taken by the Council, and that - as we noted at an earlier meeting - do not accord 
with the desire to maintain the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Kuwait or any 
other State. Such measures simply correspond to the hegemonic designs of these 
Powers in the Middle East. . . My delegation will continue to insist that the 
Council must reject any unilateral or selected approach designed solely to benefit 
certain great Powers.''92
In addition to associating unilateral action with aggressive, greed-driven interests, Cuba
also expressed concern that attempts by the United States to take unilateral military
measures could undermine the Security Council's ability to ''prevent the conflict from
becoming exacerbated and from spreading." For this reason, Cuba insisted that all action
taken in response to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf be conducted under the collective control
of the Security Council.
During the 29 August session of the Security Council, the representative from
Finland opened his comments with the following statement: "The international crisis
caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is rapidly worsening. It is important now to
maintain the determination of the international community to control the situation."93 This
clearly reveals Finland's belief that unilateral actions would not be sufficient and that a
collective unified response from the international community can control the situation.
Iraq made a similar argument later on in that same meeting: "Furthermore, by
producing this illegal resolution [665 which would purportedly enable nations to take
92United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2934, 1990: 23-25.
93United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 44-45.
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unilateral action], the United States is increasing the seriousness and complexity of the 
situation. It is forcing an escalation of tension and a resort to armed force, which will lead 
to an explosion of the situation."94
This understanding was also shared by the United Arab Emirates, which closed its 
comments during another November session of the Security Council with the following 
statement:
The most dangerous lesson to be drawn from this problem lies in the possibility of 
threatening peace and security in the world as a result of the tyranny of an 
individual over the fate of any country. Therefore, it is the international 
community’s collective responsibility to prevent the emergence of such situations 
which could lead to a state of total international chaos.95
Once again, the protection of the collective interests of peace and security is associated
with the need for the international community to take collective action in response to Iraqi
aggression.
Of course, critics could argue that these smaller, peripheral powers such as Cuba, 
Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates were only appealing to the negative meaning 
attached to this norm because they very well could have become the next victim of major 
power unilateral intervention. Indeed, this was strikingly true for Iraq. The implication 
here is that states only invoke norms when it happens to suit their interests. However, in 
addition to these peripheral states, who had strong, tangible reasons for linking unilateral 
intervention with international instability, great military and nuclear powers also expressed 
the belief that unilateral action could exacerbate matters in the Gulf and, instead, called for
94United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 72.
95United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2960, 1990: 13.
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a multilateral response to stabilize the region.
During a Security Council session attended by the foreign ministers of each state in
the Council, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze expressed the belief that collective
action through the United Nations provided the international community with the greatest
chances for resolving the conflict peacefully. "I cannot fail to mention the fact that from
the very start of the crisis, the Soviet Union has placed the main stress in its policy on
collective efforts based on full use of the rights and capabilities of the United Nations and
on the need to resolve the crisis through non-military, political and diplomatic methods."96
The United States presented the Security Council with a similar argument
regarding the stabilizing effects of acting collectively. "The United States has voted in
favor of resolution 666 (1990) because it guarantees the integrity of the United Nations'
efforts to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait by peaceful means. Since 2 August, the
members of the Security Council have worked together to repel the aggression against
Kuwait and to define a new era of international co-operation under the Charter."97
Specifically, the United States expressed its normative preference for taking multilateral
action through the United Nations because it could guarantee that the international
*
coalition would act in unison and make a good-faith effort to resolve the conflict 
peacefully. The Congress of the United States further supported this intersubjective 
understanding of multilateralism in a joint resolution issued on 27 September by linking 
action through the United Nations with a peaceful, nonmilitary resolution to the conflict:
96United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2943, 1990: 76.
97United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2939, 1990: 38.
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The Congress supports the President's emphasis on diplomatic efforts, international 
sanctions, and negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations to achieve the 
United States objectives and policies set forth in section 2. The United States shall 
continue to emphasize the use of diplomatic and other nonmilitary means in order 
to achieve those objectives and policies, while maintaining credible United States 
and multinational deterrent military force.1,98
Comments made by the representative from China on 6 August in support of 
resolution 661 (1990) reflected the belief that taking multilateral action through the 
Security Council could best achieve the following peaceful, non-military objectives:
"First, it is our consistent position that relations between States must be based on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, that the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
the norms governing international relations must be maintained and that resort to force or 
the threat of force by any country to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
another country must be opposed. ""
In addition to the two aforementioned meanings that the constitutive rules of 
military intervention attach to collective and unilateral action — the nature of the interests 
motivating the subject to act and the degree of volatility that that action will likely incur — 
the constitutive rules also attach a third meaning to the mode of military intervention. 
Whereas intersubjective understandings perceive collective action to carry with it the 
authority of the international community, unilateral intervention is typically viewed as 
either unsanctioned by the international community or as a potential threat to the authority 
of any given collective body.
98Congress, House, The Persian Gulf Crisis, 21.
"United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 38.
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During the Persian Gulf crisis, the international community perceived the collective
nature of international organizations to be constituted with authority. During the 6
August Security Council session, France argued that acting multilaterally through the
Security Council authorized the international coalition to take collective action and
obligated Iraq to concede to UN demands. "Iraq is now required to implement without
delay or condition Security Council resolution 660 (1990) which, adopted under Chapter
VII of the Charter, is binding on all States. It is up to us all to take appropriate steps to
ensure compliance with the text of that resolution. This is why we believe that the draft
resolution that has been distributed is fully justified and we have decided to sponsor it."100
Thus, France perceived the collective action to be legitimate precisely because it was
approved through the multilateral channels of the Security Council.
In a Security Council session on August 9, Malaysia also argued that the
international community should act through the Security Council because that body, by
reflecting the will of the community, is empowered with moral authority:
The world has come a long way from the history of wars and miseries brought 
about as a result of ambitions and imperatives of States to expand and annex other 
States around them. There is now total rejection of such acts and policies. The 
Security Council this time can do no less. The annexation of Kuwait is totally 
unacceptable. In rejecting the annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council will 
need to do so from the high ground that it represents as a collective international 
authority, and it must be prepared to take the necessary action to restore Kuwait 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity.101
Thus, after making the case that Iraq's actions were "unacceptable" because they resulted
100United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 21.
101United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2934, 1990: 21.
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from the '’ambitions” and "imperatives" of individual states to expand, Malaysia argued
that the Security Council provided the most appropriate and effective means to right this
injustice because it carried with it the authority and the moral "high ground" that
accompanies the collective and unified will of the international community.
The international community then perceives the authority that emanates from the
Security Council's collective nature as giving the decisions of the body weight and putting
it in a position to dictate commands. Comments made by the representative from Canada
implicitly reveal this belief that the Security Council's multilateral character bestowed it
with authority that all individual states must recognize. "Once again, Iraq chose to ignore
the single, unanimous voice of the international community. . . Yet again, Iraq has failed
to act in response to the unanimous call of this body."102 Canada's comments suggest that
Iraq was expected to respond to the resolutions simply because they reflected the
unanimous opinion of the international community. Note specifically how the
"unanimous" character of the international community's opinion was perceived to
empower the authority of that opinion with an uncontestable and incontrovertible quality
and thereby represented a kind of mandate from the community of nations.
The arguments posed by Cuba during the 6 August session address the question of
how subjects must be constituted so as to be empowered with the authority of the
international community and thereby enable the subject to legitimately intervene militarily:
While we were discussing or negotiating or holding consultations on this draft 
resolution, the United States Government sent a contingent of marines to the 
territory of Liberia. I do not recall any consultations held on that subject. I am not
102United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 33.
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aware of any Security Council resolution or request made by any group of states to 
invite United States marines to enter the territory of Liberia without permission. 
Yet they are and the United States has said, there they will remain for as long as 
• they consider necessary.103
Thus, Cuba's comments reveal specifically how it perceived the requirements for legitimate
international action to exist. Note that simply obtaining permission from Liberia and
acting at the request of the Kuwaiti government did not qualify as legitimate grounds for
action. Such bilateral agreements did not constitute "legitimate" action in the eyes of
Cuba. Instead, a resolution from the Security Council or the multilateral support from a
"group of states" was first needed before the United States can even station troops in
Liberia during the crisis. Accordingly, Cuba differentiates between acting as an agent of
the international community and acting on behalf of a single state. This thereby called into
question the legitimacy of the latter even when it was motivated by a just cause.
The United States took this meaning attached to collective action one step further
when it argued that the multilateral character of the United Nations not only authorized
the coalition to take action, but that the Charter of the United Nations itself obligated its
members to take that action. "Iraq's policy must fail. As Members of the United Nations
we are all bound by our Charter obligations to oppose Iraq's policy, accomplish the
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to obtain the re-establishment of legitimate
Kuwaiti authority."104
Additionally, just as it is perceived that the collective nature of decision making
103United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990, 38-41.
104United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2962, 1990: 22.
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processes can empower that decision with authority, intersubjective understandings of 
intervention also view unilateral actions as lacking authority and are therefore considered 
to be a source of illegitimacy. During a 6 August meeting of the Security Council, the 
Soviet Union stated, "In this situation, the Soviet Union actively facilitated the adoption of 
resolution 660 (1990) by the Security Council. The Soviet Union believed it important
that the Security Council immediately and decisively condemn the gross invasion of
*
Kuwait by Iraqi forces. Now it is very important that the Security Council resolution be 
fully and immediately implemented."105 Accordingly, because the unilateral invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraqi forces lacked authority and international legitimacy, it not only subjected 
Iraq to condemnation in the eyes of the international community, but also obligated the 
international community to take some form of action.
During the same meeting, the United States posed a similar argument which 
suggested that individual states possessed neither the license nor the authority to defy the 
collective will of the international community. "Iraq, through its actions has rejected 
United Nations Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and the calls from its own region 
and from the non-aligned States. Its response to the world community has been scorn.
The United Nations Security Council states unequivocally today that the family of all 
nations will not tolerate this behavior."106 This statement reveals two interesting points 
regarding the intersubjective understandings of authority. First, the unilateral nature of 
Iraq's position stripped its actions of all authority, and second, that both the formal
105United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 31.
106United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 18.
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structure of the UN and the informal coalition of regional states drew authority from their
multilateral character.
In a letter sent to the Secretary-General on 15 August, the Permanent
Representative of Libya argued that, "The situation in the Arab Gulf continues to be
unacceptable. The beginning, on 14 August 1990, of the blockade of ships in the Arab
Gulf is an act of open aggression, since it is being carried out by the forces of free States
which are following their military commands."107 Clearly, Libya perceived only those
forces acting under the authority of the United Nations, and not any national governments,
to be legitimate. The letter went on to urge that such action be taken in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations:
The Council will determine in a resolution which forces will be permitted to be 
present in the Gulf and will spell out their mandate. As soon as the resolution is 
adopted, those forces will don the United Nations uniform, wear its emblem and 
carry its flag and place themselves under the direct command of the Security 
Council, which alone has the authority, under the Charter of the United Nations, to 
determine the size of such forces and the length of their mission.108
In response to these accusations, realists would expect the United States to argue
that such unilateral military actions were necessitated by the original act of aggression
committed by Iraq and the subsequent need to defend Kuwait's territorial integrity and
restore order in the region. This argument would implicitly suggest that the United States
felt the need to take advantage of its military superiority in order to defend the regional
balance of power.
107Lauterpacht, 246.
108Lauterpacht, 246.
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In actuality, though, the United States defended its actions by citing two 
multilateral organs as authorizing the blockade. "These actions are being taken by the 
United States in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, 
recognized in Article 51 of the Charter. The application of this inherent right in response 
to the Iraqi armed attack on Kuwait has been affirmed in resolution 661 (1990)."109
In another letter sent from Libya to the Secretary-General, a similar argument was
posed:
We declare that the orders issued by the United States President Bush to intercept 
and inspect shipping in the Gulf and neighbouring maritime areas are legally void 
and constitute a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. No State 
is entitled to act alone in such a situation. The orders should be issued by the 
Security Council, not by the United States National Security Council. If such 
actions continue, they may lead to a disaster for world peace."110
Here, Libya argued that the United States could further destabilize the situation on the
grounds that it lacked the authority of a multilateral organization and any action taken
would be illegitimate.
In another letter sent to the Secretary-General on 27 August 1990, Libya
reaffirmed its opinion that the unilateral actions of the United States were illegal and
illegitimate because they lacked international authority:
That call [for the Security Council to reexamine the legitimacy of U.S. actions] 
was contained in our aforementioned letter [of 14 August 1990], in which 
attention was called to the fact that the unilateral dispositions made by the United 
States of America and its allies represents a violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations and a threat to international peace and security since they are not endowed 
with any international legitimacy.
109Lauterpacht, 247.
110Lauterpacht, 248.
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I should further like to thank the members of the Council for the diligence shown 
by them in the course of the consultations and deliberations which culminated in 
the meeting held by the Council on 25 August 1990 and which was convened in 
deference to the Charter of the United Nations and in order to maintain that peace 
which is of concern to us all. There can be no doubt that it was a serious attempt 
to respect legitimacy and to place the measures adopted in their proper legal 
framework under the auspices of the Council.
I nevertheless express my disappointment that Council resolution 665 (1990) does 
not reflect the spirit of the Charter but only endorses a fa it accompli that was 
imposed by force and which clearly trifles with international legitimacy. This is the 
most serious aspect of the matter, since it is a contrived resolution that was 
adopted under pressure exerted by the United States on the Organization.111
These arguments not only reveal that Libya perceived the actions taken by the United
States to be illegitimate because its unilateral nature lacked authority, but also that even
actions conducted under the auspices of the Security Council could lack international
authority if they were forced through by the coercive will of a single power in defiance of
the international community.
Accordingly, in addition to blatant acts of unilateral aggression, the international
community also perceives collective military action that is conducted to unevenly further
the interests of individual states to erode that coalition's authority. During the 29 October
session of the Security Council, the representative from Iraq argued, "We believe that the
Council has exceeded its mandate, because it is a political body consisting of members
who seek only to advance their own political interests."112 Thus, just as acting collectively
on behalf of the common interests of the international community empowers the coalition
with authority, that authority can be diminished if the actions of individual states fail to
mLauterpacht, 251.
112United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2951, 1990: 32.
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reflect the will of the international community and those states are perceived to have
reverted back to the pursuit of selfish interests.
During an 18 August session, Cuba argued that, . .With the full knowledge of
the Security Council, one Power, a permanent member of the Council, has abrogated to
itself the power to decide what goes into or out of the territory of Kuwait and Iraq. The
United States has not received any authorization from anyone to impede the arrival of
food and medicine to Iraq."113 Accordingly, Cuba argues that the United States has
exceeded the authority granted by the Security Council by deciding for itself how the
interests of the group could be best pursued.
For this reason, the international community believes that the requirements of
legitimate social action charges the Security Council with the responsibility of deciding
exactly how each Council resolution should be implemented. If the Council were to fail to
work out even the specific logistics behind carrying out the will of the international
community, that will could be subverted by unilateral interests and thus the authority of
the collective action would be undermined.
For example, Yemen explained that it failed to vote in favor of resolution 665
during a 25 August meeting precisely for these reasons:
As to the substance of the draft resolution [665], we would observe that for the 
first time in the history of the United Nations - and particularly in the history of the 
Security Council - unclear powers are being granted to undertake unspecified 
actions without a clear definition of the Security Council's role and powers of 
supervision over those actions. . . For these reasons, we cannot vote in favor of the
113United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2937, 1990: 28.
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draft resolution. . ,114
Additionally, the representative from Cuba also voiced concern over the
ambiguous nature of the resolution:
Reference is made to using forces, but it is not known who the members of those 
forces are; we know it if we read the newspapers, but no one can know it from a 
reading of the draft resolution the Council is about to adopt. We do not know 
when the Council determined that certain countries would form part of those 
forces. Nor do we know who commands them, although all of us more or less 
suspect that it is a high ranking officer of the United States forces, identified every 
day as the chief of operations in the region. . . However carefully and however 
often one reads the draft resolution now before us, it is impossible to find any of 
these criteria or requirements [in the UN Charter for the application of armed 
forces] in any of its paragraphs. In adopting this draft resolution, as I imagine the 
Council will do, the Council will in fact through its own resolution allow an 
illegitimate situation to be perpetuated.115
Thus, the source of the resolution's illegitimacy rested in its failure to comply with the
Charter's requirements that the Security Council maintain control and authority over the
forces sent into action, rather than simply providing a blank check for any nation to
unilaterally use its military forces as it sees fit.
In addition to Cuba and Yemen, Colombia also voiced concern over the
ambiguous nature of the resolution. Although Colombia did in fact vote for the resolution
in order to demonstrate the resolve of the international community, it qualified its support
for the resolution by adding, "We share some of the anxieties expressed by the Permanent
Representatives of Yemen and Cuba over the fact that in this draft resolution the Security
Council is delegating authority without specifying to whom. Nor do we know where that
114United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 8-10.
115United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 13-15.
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authority is to be exercised or who receives it. Indeed, whoever does receive it is not 
accountable to anyone."116
Finally, Yemen made a similar argument during the 29 November meeting by 
suggesting that the ambiguity of resolutions would likely lead to the erosion of the 
coalition into the unilateral display of military might by a few major powers. Specifically, 
Yemen argued that "the draft resolution before us is not related to a specific article of 
Chapter VII of the Charter; hence the Security Council will have no control over those 
forces, which will fly their own national flags. Furthermore, the command of those forces 
will have nothing to do with the United Nations, although their actions will have been 
authorized by the Security Council."117
Thus, intersubjective understandings of the constitutive rules of military 
intervention in the Gulf conflict provided unilateral modes of action with negatively- 
charged meanings and collective actions with positively-charged meanings. Consequently, 
by providing social action with meaning, the constitutive rules underlying norms of 
intervention enabled action to occur in the Gulf by linking actions with meaningful 
intentions and providing an intersubjective framework within which action could be 
understood by others.
116United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 22-25.
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CHAPTER VII
NORMS AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES
In addition to constituting action in the Gulf, internationally-held norms also 
played another important role in the conflict. The constitutive rules underpinning norms 
of military intervention also shaped interaction by providing states with normatively- 
charged meanings that could be used in the construction of interests and identities. 
Specifically, intersubjective understandings of the constitutive rules allowed states to 
empower themselves with international authority by constructing collective interests and 
identities. And, at the same time, the constitutive rules enabled states to undermine the 
collective identities of their enemies by linking those enemies with the negative meanings 
associated with unilateral intervention.
The Iraqi Construction o f U.S. Hegemonic Militarism
From the start of the crisis, Iraq continually attempted to undermine the
multilateral identity of the UN coalition by exposing it to be nothing more than a tool of
the United States and its hegemonic designs:
With due respect for the Council and for the States that are sponsoring the draft 
resolution, I cannot fail to stress one fact that is known to everyone. This draft 
resolution was prepared by a single State. Pressure was exerted on all the other 
States to go along with this. That makes the draft resolution null and void,
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because anything imposed by force and threat is not legitimate under the principles 
of the Charter.
We had hoped that after the end of the cold war we would see a new climate in 
international relations, a climate marked by a greater role played by the United 
Nations and the Security Council with regard to the maintenance of peace and 
security in the world. However, we regret to note a super-Power trying to use the 
United Nations and the Security Council in order to achieve its objectives - as if 
the Security Council were simply its Foreign Ministry. All this arises from the fact 
that that State owes the United Nations $675 million and it is using this as a means 
of exerting pressure on the United Nations.118
Thus, Iraq argued that the resolution is not valid because it represents neither the will of
the international community nor the common good. Instead, the resolution compromises
the collective interests of maintaining peace and security for the individual interests of the
United States.
In a letter sent to the Secretary-General on 13 August, the Representative of Iraq
further attacked the collective character of the coalition:
What has thus far transpired in the Council would not have taken place had it not 
been for the methods of pressure and deception employed by the United States 
with a number of Council members in order to induce them to vote for the said 
resolutions. The United States is thus endeavouring to establish itself as the 
controller of the world and of its destiny.119
Similarly, Iraq later argued that the Council's resolution provides nothing more
than a facade of legitimacy designed to obscure massing U.S. military power in the region:
The sponsors endeavored to undermine the Security Council's authority and to 
circumvent the mechanisms enshrined in the Charter and embodied in the Security 
Council and tried to take control of that authority. . . [The resolution] replaces 
international legitimacy on the high seas with the arbitrary individual use of force 
under the umbrella of the Security Council unfurled through the adoption of an
118United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 12-15.
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illegitimate resolution. The full historical responsibility for this falls squarely on 
the shoulders of the United States of America and its allies.120
In this sense, the Council's resolutions no longer represented the unified will of the
international community, but rather, the unilateral designs of the United States military
machine.
During the 29 October session of the Security Council, Iraq explicitly attempted to
construct the identity of the United Nations coalition as only a pretense for premeditated
U.S. aggression that would only serve to escalate an already volatile situation.
This process of escalation that is spearheaded by the United States and its allies 
and applauded by their lackeys is now on the verge of reaching its pinnacle in the 
form of the draft resolution before the Council. It will make it possible for the 
warmongers and advocates of carnage and aggfession to declare that they have 
exhausted all peaceful means and failed and that the only option now is war. The 
fact of the matter is that the United States started its military buildup on land and 
at sea even before it was asked to do so by and State in the region. The United 
States has engaged in aggression and taken the initiative of decreeing a naval 
blockade with its ally, the United Kingdom. That is an act of war and an act of 
aggression under the definition of aggression adopted by the General Assembly.
The United States acted in that manner before the Council adopted resolution 661 
(1990). That resolution, which the United States pushed through for adoption on 
6 August 1990 by exerting all sorts of pressures - only three days after the 
adoption of resolution 660 (1990) - was designed simply to allow the United 
States to ensure cover for its acts of aggression against Iraq and to claim legality 
for its aggression against Iraq under the umbrella of resolution 661 (1990) 
although that resolution did not and does not authorize the United States or any 
other State to blockade Iraq. My Government has rightfully described that 
resolution as unjust and declared that it contravenes the United Nations Charter.121
According to Iraq's depiction of the situation, the coalition was no longer serving the
collective interests of restoring peace and order to the region, but rather, providing cover
120United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 71-76.
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for the United States to pursue its own expansionist interests. By attaching these
meanings associated with unilateral intervention, Iraq thereby attempted to reveal the
illegitimacy and illegality of the United States’ actions.
During the 29 November meeting, Iraq attempted one more time to destroy the
multilateral identity of the coalition:
As a cover for its aggressive and imperialist policies in the region, the American 
President alleges that the crisis is not the result of a stand by the United States 
against Iraq. He claims that it is the world that stands against Iraq in a manner 
unprecedented in the annals of the United Nations., . The current crisis has 
shown, among other things, that the United States totally dominates the Security 
Council and its arbitrary and biased procedures.122
Note that, while referring to the UN-sponsored forces, Iraq did not address the Security
Council or the Secretary-General, but rather the President of the United States so as to
emphasize its unilateral control over the Council.
In addition to undermining the multilateral character of the UN coalition, Iraq
attempted to construct its own identity as the victim of expansionistic U.S. imperialist
forces in the Gulf. In reference to the impeded flow of medical and food supplies in the
Gulf, for example, Iraq argued:
The United States has, however, had the intention from the very outset of 
preventing the delivery of such supplies [such as medical and humanitarian goods] 
for the purpose of starving and intimidating the people of Iraq. . . The United 
States has also incited a number of other States to follow its example, just as it has 
sought to impose a blockade on Iraq's exports and imports, thereby appointing 
itself the policeman of the world. Its trifling with words and designations does not 
alter this fact. Iraq calls upon the international community to reject these hostile 
and inhuman acts and to refuse to allow the United States to abuse human life in
122United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2963, 1990: 23.
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this crude fashion. . ,123 
Through these accusations, Iraq attempted to construct the United States as the 
expansionist aggressor, constituted with a hostile and inhuman identity, and taking 
unilateral action by appointing itself judge, jury and executioner of the world.
Iraq further argued, "We believe that the haste and pressures in producing the 
resolution [665 (1990)] are designed to facilitate large-scale military aggression by United 
States forces, now massing in the oil fields of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in co­
operation with Israeli armed forces and intelligence circles. For that reason, the 
resolution, while undermining the Security Council's authority, is void in substance and 
detail."124 Thus, by charging that the driving force behind the UN coalition was not the 
protection of Kuwait, but rather, the United States' militaristic goals, Iraq further 
constructed its identity as a victim of U.S. aggression.
In a letter sent to the Secretary-General on 5 November, the Representative from 
Iraq took this construction one step further by explicitly writing that the underlying 
objectives of U.S. involvement in the Gulf was to ensure the destruction of Iraqi economic 
and military power:
The United States aggressive escalation against Iraq is being conducted in isolation 
from the Security Council resolutions and from the international community's 
desire to avoid war. . . The United States of America lays down conditions which 
it deliberately presents as humiliating and capitulatory for Iraq, and it does so in 
order to prepare the way for the destruction of its economy and the elimination of 
its power to defend itself so as to make the Arab nation easy prey to the 
expansionist ambitions of the Israeli entity. The United States of America has
123Lauterpacht, 198.
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exploited the new international situation in its own interest and has imposed, 
through the United Nations Security Council, the adoption of unjust and iniquitous 
resolutions against Iraq.125
In addition to constructing its identity as a victim of U.S. hegemonic designs, Iraq
attempted to reconstitute itself with the collective interests of the Arab states:
We sound a clear warning concerning aggression against Iraq. We warn that the 
United States military forces in the Gulf are not there to defend anyone; they are 
there and will remain there as a continuing factory for occupation and threats, with 
the principal objectives of taking over the region's oil wealth and controlling its 
production, pricing and marketing, so as to render the region's oil a weapon.126
Thus, by sounding this warning to other Arab states, Iraq attempted to gain greater
legitimacy by reconstituting itself with the collective interests, of the entire Gulf region and
then contrasting this with the unilateral interests of the United States.
Iraq attempted to constitute itself with similar interests in a letter sent to the UN
Secretary-General:
In conclusion, I must say to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and through you to the 
entire international community that the Iraqi people, the Arab nation and all free 
peoples of the world who are proud of their sovereignty and independence will 
reject by all legitimate means the attempts of the United States to extend its 
domination over the world by force, intimidation and deception.127
With the authority of its collective identity, Iraq now felt it was in a position to call on the
international community to reject these inhuman abuses committed by the United States
and its fight for world domination.
Iraq also presented a similar argument concerning the dangers that U.S.
125Lauterpacht, 194.
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involvement in the Gulf posed to the Arab nation in a Security Council session shortly 
thereafter:
It is regrettable - indeed, it is a grave matter - that the Council has completely 
disregarded the Arab initiatives calling for a peaceful Arab solution of the Gulf 
crisis. The dangerous nature of this stance is that, in the end, it shall lead to a 
situation wherein foreign Powers shall benefit at the expense of legitimate Arab 
interests especially - and this is the crux of the matter - by occupying the Arab oil 
fields and depriving the Arab nation with all its countries of exercising their 
sovereignty over their own natural resources or adopting production and pricing 
policies that serve the legitimate interests of the Arab States and safeguard their 
national security, whether they be oil producers or not.
This disregard by the Security Council and its permanent members of Arab 
initiatives has not been spontaneous or a simple mistake. It is a deliberate policy 
that bespeaks a determination not to permit any regional organization or Power to 
act independently or apart from United States interests. This also confirms the 
intention to perpetrate aggression against Iraq and the determination to break the 
back of any striving by the Arabs to exercise their own will. The aim of course is 
to occupy permanently the Arab oil fields, control navigation in the Gulf and 
threaten the national security of Iraq and other Arab countries.128
Iraq was not simply speaking on behalf of its own interests, but for all "legitimate
Arab interests." Implicit in these comments was the Iraqi call to arms for all Arab nations
to join together in opposition to the unilateral threat posed by expansionist U.S.
aggression. Iraq was no longer the aggressor unjustly invading neighboring Kuwait, but
rather, the victim of the United States' quest for regional hegemony, constituted with the
inherent right to self defense. In closing its comments, Iraq would add, "At the same time,
Iraq stresses its right and its readiness to defend itself against any foreign aggression,
especially the one now being prepared by the United States in co-ordination and
128United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2951, 1990: 17.
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consultation with the Israeli entity."129
By the end of November, the passage of* resolution 678 authorizing the use of all
necessary means was drawing near. Accordingly, Iraq attempted harder than ever to
construct the identity of the United States as a potential threat to peace and stability:
Some are asking questions about the role of other members of the world 
Organization who have voted to select those who represent them in this body at a 
time when they stand helplessly by, unable to uphold the principles of the Charter 
which are based on dialogue and peaceful settlement and not on beating the drums 
of war for imperialist purposes that are completely deviant from the logic of the 
age.130
Iraq was no longer content to simply paint itself and other Arab nations as the victims of 
U.S. aggression. Now, the rest of.the world stood by "helplessly" as the "imperialist" 
United States beat the drums of war in open defiance of the interests and the will of the 
international community.
The Coalition Construction o f the Multilateral Response to Iraqi Aggression
The above section shows how Iraq repeatedly attempted to manipulate meanings 
and construct for itself favorable interests and identities throughout the early months of 
the crisis. Additionally, the United States and its allies attempted to construct interests 
and identities that would empower the UN coalition with legitimacy before the eyes of the 
international community. One of the primary goals of the United States and Kuwait was 
to reinforce Iraq's identity as a unilateral aggressor acting in violation of international
129United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2951, 1990: 37.
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norms and bent on the destruction of Kuwaiti sovereignty. During the 24 August session
of the Security Council, Kuwait attempted to take full advantage of the negative meanings
attached to unilateral military action in the construction of the Iraqi identity:
. . . Effort on the part of the Council has led to the adoption of five resolutions 
which expressed the conscience and sentiments of the whole world in condemning 
the Iraqi regime, its expansionist schemes and its total disregard for human values 
and principles, for international norms and for the fundamentals of civilized human 
relations. Thus the Iraqi regime has been totally isolated from the civilized 
community of nations and now finds itself in a dark comer, following a just 
decision by the world community and the Council, namely, that it is an outlaw, 
non-peace-loving regime which the international community cannot trust or deal 
with, and for that reason it has imposed comprehensive sanctions on that regime.131
Specifically, Kuwait attempted to construct Iraq's identity as a unilateral aggressor
constituted with expansionist, self-centered interests and acting in direct violation of
internationally-held norms. For this reason, Kuwait branded Iraq as an outlaw nation
acting in defiance of the will of the international community. In doing so, Kuwait was
careful to emphasize the unified opinion of the international community by referring to a
singular "conscience" of the "whole world," and then to contrast that image with Iraq's
isolation from the "civilized" world.
Additionally, during another August session of the Security Council, the Soviet
Union constructed Iraq's identity around its initial, unilateral use of military force to justify
its decision to support resolution 661 (1990):
We do not advocate hasty decisions, but we must face the fact that the pace of 
events taking place - events which started with the sudden invasion of Iraqi forces 
into Kuwait - dictates that we take the necessary steps immediately, including steps 
by the Security Council, in accordance with the direct requirements of the United 
Nations Charter. We fully realize this, and we therefore have supported the co­
131United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2938, 1990: 57.
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ordinated action which the international community has been forced to take by the 
situation that has developed.132
Thus, by constructing Iraq as a unilateral aggressor bound to strike again at any moment,
the Soviet Union attempted to manipulate the meaning constitutively attached to unilateral
intervention to make some form of international action imperative. Accordingly, the
"sudden invasion of Iraqi forces" then "dictated" that the international community respond
to the act of aggression.
In the United States, President Bush attempted to keep attention focussed on Iraq's
original act of unilateral aggression against Kuwait. Bush opened his address before
Congress on 11 September with the following comments:
We gather tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are 
tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2d, following negotiations and 
promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi 
Army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within 3 days, 
120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait, and moved south to 
threaten Saudi Arabia."133
In addition to constructing Iraq's identity as a unilateral aggressor, the United
States and its allies attempted to empower the UN coalition forces by reinforcing its
multilateral identity. During the 6 August session of the Security Council, Kuwait opened
the meeting by emphasizing the collective nature of the Security Council and its decision
to pass resolution 660 (1990):
That resolution was an expression of the fact that the Council defends international 
peace and security, represents the conscience of the world and indeed protects the 
small nations. . . Despite what has been inflicted on my beloved country. . . we
132United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 32.
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had hoped that the brutal invading Power would heed the will of the international 
community and particularly the unprecedented unanimous and strong international 
condemnation."134
Note how Kuwait was careful to make three points in its opening comments: first, that
the Council was defending the common interests of peace and security; second, that its
voice represented the singular and unified conscience of the world; and third, that it was
therefore empowered with the authority to protect small nations from violations of
international norms.
In an August Security Council meeting, Ambassador Pickering of the United
States also attempted to construct the identity of the UN coalition as a multilateral force
representing the collective opinion of the international community:
"The international community, by this draft resolution, demands immediate 
implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 660 (1990). The 
many statements from individual States around the world, the European 
Community, the Gulf Co-Operation Council, the Arab League and the non-aligned 
States condemn the Iraqi invasion and demand withdrawal."135
Through this statement, Pickering was not speaking for the United States government, but
rather, the international community as a collective identity. Additionally, the only
individual state that was mentioned by name is Iraq, so as to emphasize its isolation from
the regional and international organizations mentioned by name around the world. In
doing so, Pickering implied that the resolution's collective nature put it in a position to
"condemn" the invasion and "demand" Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.
President Bush attempted to further construct the coalition's collective identity and
134United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 4-6.
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interests in an address before Congress on 11 September:
These goals [expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoring peace and stability 
to the region] are not ours alone. They have been endorsed by the United Nations 
Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most countries share our concern 
for principle. And many have a stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is 
not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq 
against the world.”136
To reassure Congress that the United States would maintain its efforts to act 
multilaterally, President Bush stated in a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives:
I also want to emphasize that the mission of our Armed Forces has not changed. 
Our Forces are in the Gulf region in the exercise of our inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defense against Iraq's aggression and consistent with U.N. 
Security Council resolutions related to Iraq's on-going occupation of Kuwait. The 
United States and other nations continue to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis. 
We and our coalition partners share the common goals of achieving the immediate, 
complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the 
restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the protection of the lives of 
citizens held hostage by Iraq both in Kuwait and Iraq, and the restoration of 
security and stability in the region."137
In constructing the multilateral identity of the coalition, Bush was careful to make three
points. First, he argued that both the Charter of the United Nations and numerous
Security Council resolutions had authorized the intervention. Second, he emphasized the
coalition's objective of resolving the conflict peacefully. And third, Bush asserted that the
intervening forces were working towards the "common goals" of restoring "security" and
"stability" to the region.
In a 25 September session of the Security Council, the United Kingdom also
136Congress, House, The Persian Gulf Crisis, 25.
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endorsed this sentiment that the UN coalition represented a collective and united front
against Iraqi aggression. "It is not the United States ranged against Iraq, but the States
united. Every member of this coalition against aggression wants to see the independence
of Kuwait restored by peaceful means, and that is why we have to make every effort to
make the United Nations embargo against Iraq effective."138 Specifically, the United
Kingdom emphasized the united will of the international community in opposition to Iraq
and the desire to resolve the conflict through non-military means to give the UN
resolutions a stronger voice.
In a later session of the Security Council, the United States further emphasized the
multilateral support behind the coalition's actions to constitute the intervening forces with
the interests and authority of the international community:
The Council's resolutions are clear. Since 2 August, the international community 
has acted in unison to condemn Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait, and 
has worked to take appropriate and measured steps to implement its resolution 
calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Concerted action under 
Article 41 is already having an effect, signalling to Baghdad the international 
resolve that aggression upon a sovereign State Member of the United Nations 
must not be rewarded. Should Iraq continue to try to ignore and deny the 
international community, we believe that the Council will have to take further 
measures as prefigured in the resolution.139
Thus, acting in "unison" and in accordance with Article 41 empowered the coalition with
the authority to "condemn" Iraqi aggression and put the coalition in a position to demand
immediate withdrawal.
Finally, on numerous occasions, the United States and its allies attempted to
138United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2943, 1990: 42.
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deflate Iraqi accusations that the Security Council was dominated by the U.S. to further 
embellish the coalition's collective identity. In response to such Iraqi allegations during an 
August session of the Security Council, the United States responded, "And the idea that 
this Council has somehow become the United States' foreign ministry is an insult to the 
members of the Council and to their determination to resolve this issue. We all speak for 
our own countries and we all speak, I hope, with one voice on this particular question."140 
Thus, Pickering chose to defend against the Iraqi accusations by pointing out that the 
resolution not only represented the collective opinions of the international community, but 
also that the community remained unified in its opposition to Jraq's invasion of Kuwait.
Similarly, the United States defended the coalition's multilateral identity against 
Iraqi accusations of U.S. imperialism and hegemony by arguing, "It is obvious that he [the 
representative from Iraq] believes that there is only one, or perhaps two, votes against him 
in the Council. He should re-examine the votes on the recent resolutions, where the 
Council has spoken with unamity, and I hope that he and his Government will recognize, 
take heed of and listen to the views of the Council."141
140United Nations, Security Council, S/PV.2933, 1990: 16.
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CONCLUSION
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait triggered an immediate response from nations around 
the world and led to the passage of a series of Security Council resolutions condemning 
Saddam Hussein's blatant violations of international norms. Following months of 
multilateral discussions and debates, the United Nations Security Council eventually 
authorized coalition forces to collectively intervene and expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
Empirical evidence suggests that the multilateral character of this response can 
best be explained by internationally-held norms concerning appropriate uses of military 
force and their relationship to the construction of interests and identities in the Gulf. To 
review, constructivist analysis of pre-war discourse in the Gulf reveals that the constitutive 
rules of military intervention provided the mode of unilateral intervention with three 
specific, negatively charged meanings, and collective intervention with three positive 
meanings. Consequently, the constitutive rules branded unilateral intervention as 
"illegitimate" and collective intervention as "legitimate" at the normative level.
Intersubjective understandings of norms, as constituted by these specific meanings, 
then had important consequences for the decision-making processes that guided 
international action in the Gulf. By influencing states' perceptions of interests and 
affecting understandings of acceptable forms of behavior, internationally-held norms both
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constituted and shaped interventionary practices by providing states with the building 
blocks needed to construct legitimate interests and identities. Specifically, both Iraq and 
the UN coalition forces attempted to manipulate the meanings constitutively attached to 
norms of military intervention to create for themselves collective identities and interests 
that would empower their causes with international legitimacy.
This is why the United States and its allies chose to respond to Iraqi aggression in 
the Gulf through the multilateral channels of the United Nations. As for Iraq, after its 
initial use of unilateral force to invade Kuwait, constituting itself with the collective 
interests of the Arab Nation proved to be too difficult a task., As a result, its subsequent 
appeals to international norms fell upon deaf ears. Iraq had no recourse to international 
law and could not prevent the Security Council from authorizing collective intervention in 
the Gulf.
By exploring the role that norms played in the construction of interests and 
identities in the Gulf conflict, this thesis provides empirical evidence that supports the 
constructivist assertion that ideas and meanings play an important role in the social 
construction of international politics. However, in order for the constructivist research 
program to reach its full potential, further empirical research is needed to explore the 
generative mechanisms by which ideas and meanings are either reproduced or 
transformed. Until that time, constructivist explanations of international politics can only 
make the minimal, though important, point that ideas simply matter.
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